The legal system possesses a distinctive language through which the essence of law is articulated. This pertains primarily to legal language, which legal scholars explore in three dimensions: within legal science; as a practical component of jurisprudence; and as a medium of expressing law itself. This paper proposes to examine the features of legal language through a focused case study – namely, the concept of the subject of law. The relevance of the study lies in identifying a doctrinal approach to the concept of the subject of law, which is essential for a clear understanding of its nature in the context of the information society, where distinctions between the subject and object of legal relations have increasingly blurred. The aim of this research is to explore the phenomenon of the subject of law and to analyze approaches taken by foreign legal scholars. The study seeks to develop a general understanding of this concept within foreign legal systems, to identify the lexical forms in which it is expressed, and to outline the terminological diversity associated with it. The Author employs comparative legal, historical, dialectical, formallegal, and logical methods, along with legal analysis. The study finds that foreign legal literature reflects an ambiguous understanding of the subject of law; it frequently equates the subject with legal personality. Notably, transformations in societal life are accompanied not only by the expansion of communication and information flows but also by the introduction of digital technologies. The absence of a unified theoretical framework for subjectivity (the theory of the subject) has devalued this category, adversely affecting the development of legal theory as well as legislative and law enforcement practices. Continued research into this category appears both necessary and promising, particularly with the aim of formulating recommendations for legislators on the development of legal norms governing legal subjects. The study concludes that the subject of law is characterized by a dual nature: on the one hand, it is a person; on the other, it is a legal construct formalized in normative legal texts. This duality has not previously been sufficiently addressed in legal doctrine.