According to the traditional view, the metaphysician’s task is purely theoretical: to describe the fundamental structure of reality as it is, independent of human interests. By contrast, the work of Amie Thomasson—most notably her defense of "easy ontology" and her conception of metaphysics as conceptual engineering—presents a seemingly compelling case for the erosion of the Kantian distinction between theoretical and practical rationality. In this paper, we show how Thomasson’s deflationary approach to metaphysics effectively relocates metaphysical inquiry from the domain of pure theoretical rationality to the domain of practical reason. According to Thomasson, existence questions are answered by a combination of "application conditions" (conceptual/linguistic rules) and empirical facts. If the rules for using the term "table" are met by a certain arrangement of atoms, the existence of the table follows analytically. Consequently, the "hard" work of metaphysics is not a theoretical search for deep truths about the world, but rather a normative and practical (metalinguistic) negotiation over our conceptual framework. In Thomasson's view, many metaphysical disputes can, and should, be resolved by performing the right kind of conceptual engineering. This shift transforms the metaphysician into a conceptual engineer. We are going to explore three key ways Thomasson’s philosophy bridges the theoretical-practical divide in metaphysics: (1) metametaphysical deflationism and the reduction of ontological inquiry to the practical application of linguistic norms; (2) metaphysics as conceptual engineering, where the choice of a conceptual scheme is guided by practical goals, values, and the functions we need our language to perform; and (3) the normative dimension of metaphysics, where "theoretical" rationality in metaphysics is inextricably tied to "practical" reason—specifically, the normative task of deciding how we ought to categorize the world. Finally, by critically assessing Thomasson’s rejection of "heavyweight" metaphysics and her neopragmatist reconceptualisation of the field, we identify some significant weaknesses in her overall project and argue in favour of a more traditional conception of metaphysics as a genuinely theoretical enterprise.