further explains how these feelings work: as properties of individuals' perceptual experiences, these feelings influence perception. Notably, this hypothesis based on affective feelings with different valences has been substantiated, whereas the existing evidence is not compelling enough. Moreover, whether specific affective feelings can be experienced as properties of target perception remains unclear. Addressing these two issues deepens our understanding of the nature of emotional representation. Hence, we investigated the affective realism hypothesis based on affective feelings with different valences and specific emotions, comparing it with the affective misattribution hypothesis. In Experiment 1, we examined the effects of affective feelings with various valences on targets' perception through the AM (1a) and CFS paradigms (1b). In Experiment 2, we investigated the effects of affective feelings with anger, sadness, and disgust using similar methods. Results from Experiments 1a and 1b consistently indicated significant differences in valence ratings of neutral faces under emotional contexts with varying valences. Experiment 2a revealed significant differences in specific emotion ratings of neutral faces under different specific emotional contexts in the AM paradigm, whereas such differences were not observed in the CFS paradigm in Experiment 2b. We concluded that affective feelings with different valences, rather than specific emotions, can be experienced as inherent properties of target perception, validating the affective realism hypothesis. These findings supported the view that the nature of emotional representation should be described as affective dimensions.