Abstract This chapter traces the staggering debt the author's views owe to Sellars, including the rejection of the given; the need for scientific theory construction in order to understand mind and language; externalism and a representational or 'picturing' correspondence with the world (along with coherence as the test of correspondence); and intentionality as the key explanandum in the philosophy of mind. But there are three shifts away: (1) the "Norms of nature" that define intentionality are grounded more deeply in natural selection than in terms of the social and psychological conditioning involved in Sellars's inferentialist 'language game' analysis; (2) whereas for Sellars the norms that define intentionality derive from social linguistic norms, here intentionality is constituted solely by the Norms that govern the natural representational correspondences generated at the level of what Sellars called 'picturing' the world; and this enables (3) the rejection of the 'inferentialist' conception of language and thought.