Linguistic items are meaningful and most of our uses of them are meaningful too. In order for this to be the case, language is bound by a set of correctness-conditions according to which uses of language can be categorized as either correct or incorrect – that is, there are linguistic rules – or so it is at least plausible to suppose. Our question now is not whether or not language is meaningful and normative in this sense but whether those correctness-conditions normatively bind speakers' use of language: does this normativity of language entail the normativity of linguistic usage? Ought speakers of a language to abide by its correctness-conditions? Do linguistic rules entail linguistic norms, or, more pithily, do linguistic rules rule? I shall argue that provided we focus on the appropriate correctness-conditions – correctness-conditions framed at the level of sense rather than that of reference – these do indeed deliver oughts governing use.