In Anti-Individualism,11 S.C. Goldberg, Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification (Cambridge University Press, 2007, xiii + 265 pp. £42.75). Sanford Goldberg presents a theory of testimony and testimonial knowledge, and considers the implications of this theory for philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. According to Goldberg, plausible assumptions about testimonial knowledge provide important motivation for the view that linguistic meaning is not determined exclusively by purely internal states and processes, and that the same is true of the representational content of propositional attitudes. Instead of being determined by purely internal factors, such as the states and processes that are considered in cognitive neuroscience, or the states and processes that are studied by computational psychology, meaning and content depend, in part, on relations between individual agents and the linguistic communities that they inhabit. In short, according to Goldberg, considerations pertaining to testimonial knowledge provide motivation for semantic externalism. He also maintains that this motivation is largely independent of the arguments for externalism that are familiar from the writings of Kripke, Putnam, and Burge.22 S.A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Harvard University Press, 1980); H. Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” reprinted in H. Putnam (ed.), Mind, Language, and Knowledge: Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, (Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 215–71; Burge, T., “ Individualism and the Mental”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4 (1979), pp. 73– 121. The line of thought leading to these conclusions occupies the first half of the book. In the second half, Goldberg turns his attention to epistemological issues. What is it, he asks, for a testimonial belief to count as epistemically justified, and what is it for a testimonial belief to count as epistemically rational? He argues that these epistemic properties involve reliability in at least two ways. First, in order for testimonial beliefs to exemplify the properties, the relevant believers must be equipped with, and make use of, a reliable ability to determine whether testimony is called into question by defeaters—that is, by considerations that challenge testimony, suggesting that it may not be trustworthy. And second, the beliefs must derive from testimonial sources that are in fact reliable. Now, as is customary, Goldberg takes reliability to be intimately related to truth, and therefore to depend on factors that are external to the believer. It follows that the epistemic status of a testimonial belief is doubly dependent on external factors. According to Goldberg, then, when we reflect on the justification and rationality of testimonial beliefs, we gain a new appreciation of the plausibility of epistemological externalism—new in the sense that it is independent of the arguments for externalism that appear elsewhere in the literature. In sum, it is the author's view that plausible assumptions about testimony provide a foundation for fresh and largely autonomous arguments for semantic externalism and epistemological externalism. The book is an extended defense of this idea. The first chapter sets the stage for later developments by arguing for an initial characterization of testimonial knowledge. The characterization is based on four conditions. First, to acquire testimonial knowledge, an agent must form a belief that is testimonially grounded. In other words, the agent must form a belief in response to a piece of testimony, and in forming the belief, the agent must assume or presuppose that the testimony is reliable. Second, the agent's presupposition concerning the reliability of the testimony must be correct. Third, it must be the case that the agent arrives at a semantic interpretation of the testimony by a reliable process. That is to say, in Goldberg's words, the agent must recover “the proposition attested to by a reliable process of comprehension” (p. 31). And fourth, it must be true that the agent's acceptance of the testimony is “the upshot of a reliable capacity for distinguishing reliable from unreliable testimony” (p. 31). In all, then, reliability figures in Goldberg's initial characterization of testimonial knowledge in four different ways. Should this be a cause of concern for readers with strong internalist intuitions? Goldberg thinks not. One reason is that he is claiming only that the four reliability-involving requirements are necessary conditions of testimonial knowledge. He is allowing room for additional requirements, including requirements with a strong internalist flavor. Another reason is that, in chapter 1, at any rate, he is concerned only with knowledge. He thinks that even fairly radical internalists will be willing to allow that knowledge has a significant externalist dimension, though they would no doubt reject companion claims about epistemic justification or epistemic rationality. At all events, Goldberg offers justifications for his four conditions. The conditions are needed, he says, in order to honor the intuition that if a testimonial belief is to count as knowledge, then it cannot be a mere accident that the belief is true. Each of the second, third, and fourth conditions rules out a form of accidentality. Goldberg also uses examples to motivate the conditions. It is important to him that the conditions be accepted as correct, especially the third and fourth ones, for the book is in effect a lengthy meditation on their meaning and implications. Goldberg's argument for semantic externalism spans several chapters and is quite complex. I cannot do justice to all of its components here. In place of a complete account, I offer the following summary, which seems to capture a sizable portion of the core ideas: First premise: We have a great deal of testimonial knowledge. Second premise: Testimonial knowledge is possible only if the users of a language are equipped with procedures that enable them to recover propositions reliably from asserted sentences. (pp. 2–3) Third premise: In a wide range of cases, including a great many that arise in everyday life, we are confronted with the task of recovering a proposition from an asserted sentence in a context in which we have no real grasp of the beliefs and intentions of the speaker, and in which, therefore, we would be unable to determine which psychological states led the speaker to assert the sentence. (p. 41) Fourth premise: If, in many cases, we are unable to recover propositions from sentences by theorizing about the psychological states of speakers, then, assuming that we have the ability to recover propositions reliably, it must be true that we apply public linguistic norms in interpreting testimony—that is, fixed rules or principles that assign meanings to expressions, and that can be applied independently of assumptions about the purely psychological states and dispositions of specific speakers. (p. 41) Fifth premise: Since public linguistic norms can be applied independently of assumptions about the purely psychological states and dispositions that animate individual speakers, norms must be metaphysically independent of such states and dispositions, and it is therefore possible to imagine situations in which the operative norms are different than the ones that obtain in the actual case, but in which all purely psychological states and dispositions are the same. (pp. 104–5) Sixth premise: If the norms that assign meanings to sentences can vary while all purely psychological states and dispositions are held fixed, then semantic externalism is true. (p. 105) Conclusion: Semantic externalism is true. Although this line of thought touches most of the key bases, it also misses a few. Thus, while it is true that the fourth and fifth premises do justice to one of Goldberg's main reasons for maintaining that meaning is determined by public linguistic norms, he also has a second reason that is developed at some length. (My summary emphasizes chapter 2 at the expense of chapter 3.) In addition, I should note that Goldberg extends the present argument, which is concerned only with linguistic meanings, in such a way as to obtain the additional conclusion that the representational contents of propositional attitudes are determined externalistically. And there is also a third important omission. I will get to it in a moment. As I have represented him, Goldberg is concerned to derive semantic externalism from considerations having to do with testimonial knowledge, together with the observation that we are often unable to recover propositions reliably from asserted sentences by theorizing about the psychological states of individual speakers. If this is correct, then his line of thought is quite different than the arguments for semantic externalism that we find elsewhere in the literature. The other arguments make no mention of testimony, or of the risks that would be involved in interpreting assertions in terms of hypotheses about the psychological states of the speakers who produce them. Rather, they appeal directly to examples in which there is a dissociation between the descriptive content that a speaker has in mind in using an expression and the semantic meaning of the expression. Thus, as the reader will recall, Putnam begins one of his arguments by informing the reader that he lacks sufficient descriptive knowledge to distinguish elms from beeches, and would therefore need to obtain information from an expert in order to apply the terms “elm” and “beech” appropriately to specific trees.33 Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”. He then asks whether this fact precludes our crediting him with the ability to make true and false claims containing the words “elm” and “beech.” If, for example, he was to assert “Elms are trees,” would we deny that he had expressed a true proposition? More generally, does his lack of relevant descriptive knowledge preclude our crediting him with the ability to use “elm” and “beech” with their normal meanings? He predicts that his readers will answer “no” to both of these questions, and in most cases, this prediction has turned out to be correct. Putnam's other main arguments are also based on examples of psychological–semantic dissociations, though they tend to involve thought experiments rather than actual cases. The same is true of Kripke and Burge: They describe examples in which descriptive knowledge and meaning come apart, and then point out that these examples mandate an externalist account of meaning. It is clear that Goldberg's strategy for establishing semantic externalism is quite different than this one. Goldberg's line of thought is top-down: It relies on theoretical considerations about testimony and the elusiveness of Gricean speaker meanings. The standard arguments are bottom-up: They begin with intuitions about possible cases, and proceed from them to general morals. Goldberg's line of thought is interesting and suggestive. It deserves more attention than I can give it here. It seems unlikely, however, that it is comparable to the familiar arguments for externalism in strength and scope, even when various supplementary considerations that I have not described are added in. Among other things, the familiar arguments imply that semantic competence has an important social dimension, and more particularly, that individual agents can be credited with a grasp of the meanings of words on the of dispositions to to other of their linguistic As as I can Goldberg's line of thought to these fourth that agents must on public linguistic norms in recovering propositions from but this is about the of public linguistic norms, or what is involved in to them. As as I can the is with the that agents must have a and autonomous of all of the that would be involved in the norms and also with the that agents must have a and autonomous of the meanings that linguistic norms assign to point to the fifth It that it is possible for linguistic norms to vary while purely psychological dispositions but this is with the that agents must have a and autonomous grasp of the meanings that norms with fifth claims only that different can be is with the that agents must have an autonomous grasp of all of the meanings that in any of the In view of these it seems that the conclusion of the argument is than the conclusions of the familiar arguments for externalism. It be that there is in chapter 4 that Goldberg for his argument to have the same implications as the familiar and that, there are for the of the is a great deal of to these Goldberg to a fairly of semantic externalism. is the third that I this observation a into Goldberg must between the argument as justice to the of his and the argument in such a way that it and the familiar about the of for a grasp of and the that an agent's grasp of meanings can be and If he the argument as it Goldberg can to be a for semantic externalism that is independent of the familiar but he must also that his conclusion is than the conclusions of the familiar and also than he would And if he the argument by premises that allow for a and grasp of linguistic norms, then he can that it a fairly but the argument will no be independent of the familiar It will have to make an appeal to the that is sufficient for a grasp of and Goldberg will have to this by examples the ones by Kripke, Putnam, and Thus, no which he Goldberg will be unable to one of his main it I to of the which is to epistemological issues. As I him, Goldberg is there concerned to the following four is in the epistemic to is epistemically to testimony as there are no reasons not to the (p. as in a piece of having the epistemic or to the piece of on one of social (p. complete account of the of belief that on one of social (p. The process that in of testimony in the testimonial extends to of the social the that is for by (p. According to there is a epistemic in of testimony is the is It does not depend on having reasons to the testimony of a speaker, on having general for all speakers. The justification to which is in and are in that they both imply that the epistemic status of a testimonial belief has an important social dimension, and more particularly, that it on the reliability of the who is the of the They only in that is concerned with epistemic while is concerned with epistemic rationality. is therefore the more radical many who externalist about justification are to an internalist As for it is of a of that can be by that the testimonial beliefs of often count as knowledge, and second, that they do in forming the relevant beliefs, are from unreliable testimony by the of their and other emphasizes the most of this the that in the case of the procedures for whether testimony is called into question by are not internal to but are rather in the social of these claims are and Goldberg's of them are quite In case, his of I will not be to all of the claims here. they to the most questions, I will on and a initial but it is not to of that it into that has had to the of and is not in a to whether the is about issues. that at a and that the to begins to on other things, that there is reason to doubt that have a theory of that in to being about the and of has no for an about the of in the general And that, most is not in of a that can be to determine whether is and of can determine whether an presents the of a is in this than the to the to It would appear not. In it seems that it would be quite for to him, as it would be quite to place in a of that one on a Now, Goldberg is of examples of this and is also that, in the view of many they to the following which is of with is not epistemically in not have the epistemic to is not epistemically to testimony has or a not based on testimony, for the testimony as (p. Goldberg does not this but he its as the reader will from summary of chapter 1, Goldberg is to the following If an agent's testimonial belief is to count as knowledge, then the agent's acceptance of the relevant piece of testimony must have by a reliable capacity to distinguish reliable from unreliable (p. the one and the of principles and can it be to Goldberg's answer is that is the of two The first is that testimonial processes it is to enable the to in which is to be from in which it is not. And the second is that these processes are in fact reliable in that, in and they in acceptance in most of the the testimony is both true and and they in in most the testimony is false or (p. In then, Goldberg by it with two other The to testimony, but only in in which the following conditions are the relevant agent has no reasons for the the agent is equipped with appropriately procedures that enable him to such reasons when they and the procedures in question are reliable. The defense is at least Thus, while is a to the of is not a to the present more is not equipped with procedures for when factors are present that the of testimony into at has no such procedures that can be applied to who At first the new of is a between the of and the The new from the one in that it a on the of that can be extended to a piece of testimony only it has to a that is and that testimony can be it must a that is of with this however, seems more than In that there is a of of any for it that is only when an agent has an or a reason for that a piece of testimony is correct. who are familiar with the on testimony will as a of the view that acceptance of testimony is an autonomous and way of knowledge. According to this the of testimony does not in any way depend considerations from such of knowledge as and will also that is a of the as of these wide and are in the literature. In then, in to a between and Goldberg is to a the of the have the to be be Goldberg's it more for to their as we it the one is a significant It is from however, whether the the foundation for a general defense of Goldberg by procedures for but he about the of the What of must an agent be to And what of knowledge must an agent In the of to these questions, it is to whether the will in all of the that it is not to say, as I have that the procedures must be or strong having knowledge of the to which a piece of testimony and being to whether the testimony with that knowledge. If then Goldberg's of would be at of into for it would in effect that an agent be in a to testimony for truth, and this would tend to the that testimony can be to be I to Goldberg's of the he it as The process that in of testimony in the testimonial extends to of the social the that is for by (p. the point of in different if the testimonial beliefs of count as and therefore as knowledge, it is the in question are from unreliable testimony by the of their and other Goldberg a of interesting in this important I will however, on what he in defense of The defense begins with the following acquire knowledge (p. Knowledge a of the (p. In interpreting Goldberg's to the in we I his that if a testimonial belief is to count as knowledge, the testimony must have by a for that is both and reliable. The defense of also use of a third cannot be described as the (p. It is not to the line of thought leading from and to In it acquire knowledge testimony, the processes that produce their testimonial beliefs must at some point involve an agent who is to factors that would the reliability of testimony into are and are therefore unable to such factors on their It must be the case, therefore, that other agents an in the processes that produce testimonial beliefs in It must also be the case that these other agents have the ability to and the will to from testimony, by them from it or by them from it at that there are in fact agents who these and other who assume for the of The conclusion of the argument, is and as Goldberg is The I is that it for a between the that are for testimonial beliefs and the that are for testimony for of According to the and the may be in different It follows that it is in some for an agent to be in beliefs than has It has thought that the must have some of to and must be to to in an this allowing that agents may to the conditions concerning that there are factors in the external In to by that it is not agents but rather of agents that are the of epistemic is a and radical Although Goldberg is to be for this interesting I that, in the it is to be I we can its by our attention from and on an who testimony that is an who has in or for the of He many beliefs about what is in his but he does only on the of assertions by his is at to his on of also that the has no reason to his Rather, his is He the testimony concerning conditions the and he has no reason to that that has no sense of the factors that are reliably with testimony that is or That is to say, he has no ability to at least with to testimony about the of Now, as I Goldberg, is from by the and of his he must that has knowledge of conditions in his and also that beliefs about conditions are epistemically it seems to that these propositions are quite is an it is to him as a of epistemic He lacks even a ability to and can he has no in such an In view of these it seems to that has knowledge of the conditions in his in some sense that is quite different than the one that we have in As I it, any theory that would to beliefs, by knowledge and justification from epistemic is however, is to the question of it is possible for premises as as and to to an answer is that when we reflect on the we find that they are plausible than they at first More that both and are acquire knowledge cannot be described as the Goldberg thinks that strong from In however, it seems that our intuitions may only the that can acquire knowledge from and other in they can appropriately place a the of this that a a but in the an the with a of information about the they in that was on their and that as they the is at to make that the no from other Thus, he a who is about his the when they are a that the of and I find that I have to that this is knowledge from the The reason is that the is a and the has as no ability to distinguish between who are and who are if the beliefs that the from the are this is a though does not the is dependent on epistemic It would be to knowledge or epistemic justification to of them. I also have a about It seems to that often have a of concerning the reliability of their and other familiar in of is the I have some are in the come to be in a In a of cases, of this are by of the As a have of that their are reliable sources of information about it is for to the testimony of their concerning such their for the view that their are at least with to that their of I are to the testimony of their concerning in the great are reliable about external than ones, but it seems that the to it for them to a general of is of as they In Goldberg not to make his to the of including some fairly important ones, are by of as the of a public linguistic are the however, I the book it arguments for many significant it several important that are and it attention to a of that to be I it quite having about a of its main I a great deal from I to Goldberg's book.