According to John Rawls, “A theory of justice depends upon a theory of society” (Rawls [1971, 62] 1999, 62, omitted). G. A. Cohen, on the other hand, argues that it is a mistake to think that a normative theory is necessarily linked to an explanatory theory or theories, and specifically rejects the idea that there is a necessary or privileged relationship between principles of justice and the basic structure of society (Cohen 2008, esp. 232). Cohen's critique of Rawls's focus on the basic structure of society to the exclusion of personal behavior has been widely discussed. So far, though, inadequate attention has been given to the relationship between normative principles and social ontology in their respective conceptions of justice. Focusing on the relationship between Rawls's principles of justice and his theory of society helps to shed new light on the debate about whether the basic structure ought to be seen as the primary subject of justice. Political philosophy may contribute to how a people think of their political and social institutions as a whole, and their basic aims and purposes as a society with a history—a nation—as opposed to their aims and purposes as individuals, or as members of families and associations. Moreover, the members of any civilized society need a conception that enables them to understand themselves as members having a certain political status—in a democracy, that of equal citizenship—and how this status affects their relation to their social world. (Rawls 2001, 2–3; see also Rawls 2007, 10) My argument is premised on the idea that Rawls's principles of justice for the basic structure of society should be seen as constitutive rules of social cooperation, akin to the rules of a game, and highlights areas of overlap between Rawls's normative constructivism and John Searle's social constructivism. I begin by questioning Cohen's description of the rules of the basic structure as regulative rules, contrasting this conception of rules with the idea of constitutive rules developed by Rawls and Searle. Then I proceed to situate Rawls's approach within a tradition of thought that adopts an ethical view of the role of social institutions, concerned with constituting relations of equal liberty between citizens. I argue that a corollary of Rawls's idea of the institutional imagination is that political philosophy involves a division of justificatory labor between a moral conception and a theory of society. This both responds to, and seeks to realize, an idea of freedom as collective self-government. On this basis, I examine the idea of the institutional imagination from the point of view of first the construction of fair rules for the basic structure (the rules of the game) and then from the point of view of citizens acting in accordance with these rules within the basic structure (the players of the game). Finally, I return to the issue of how a better understanding of Rawls's social ontology provides a basis for responding to Cohen's criticisms. In Rescuing Justice and Equality, Cohen repeats and extends his critique of Rawls's difference principle. According to this critique, the domain of legally unconstrained personal choice and not just the legally coercive structure of society is a site of considerations of distributive justice. Cohen criticizes the way in which, in justifying a role for material incentives that improve the position of the least well-off, the difference principle makes unwarranted concessions to acquisitive self-interest. On Cohen's interpretation of the idea that “the personal is political,” there is no principled basis for excluding personal behavior from judgment “at the bar of justice” (Cohen 2008, 116–18). The example of the family is taken to show that the attempt to shield personal behavior from assessment in accordance with principles of justice is untenable. If we recognize the family as a site of justice, in the sense that it involves a distribution of benefits and burdens—as we might think any theory of justice ought we the from coercive structure to the of the is we with no for not also personal behavior within the of justice. The for this is that the structure of the family is with the that people (Cohen 2008, and choice in the of the on Cohen's argues that it is not to between principles of justice that to the family and that to within This is it is the that people to to that the family and of justice be to the of the family also to within Moreover, to the that the for on the basic structure is on we as an that whether in the family or labor In a just as the society that Rawls an labor Cohen's in Rescuing Justice and makes it that not to a of about justice rejects Rawls's about justice, to there is a between principles of justice for the basic structure and principles for not on the basis of a to of the by Cohen 2008, Cohen that the example of as the that “the point of the rules an be that in (Cohen 2008, The point of the rules of is to and fair The players of a in their of to it is constitutive of that the players to This Cohen's to be an critique of is the that no attention to the way in Rawls's theory of justice as is on the idea of fair rules of a Cohen that his critique of Rawls not an between within an structure and players of a the rules to as as In this his argument for an to on the of that on the of a social that to in in the that institutions that the of their the difference principle (Cohen 2008, a in players the rules to as as is an for social in a just society. is to Rawls's of the is the idea that the players not to by the rules an to the that the rules to a and fair of the the though, that of a game, the of a and fair of the be it from the players their in the Cohen that the basic structure is a structure in his sense of the a of his argument to it is as that personal behavior is of and that personal behavior is an of the basic point is that personal not of the basic is to structure that on of it be within the of principles of distributive justice. On Cohen's the basic structure as a of rules is to from the basic not members of of (Cohen 2008, The first point the of Rawls's normative to rules for the basic structure on the and on the by with the role of the rules of a and The point an of structure and that as a principle and as a Cohen that on his Rawls has to the difference principle to as as to an conception of rules that rejects an of structure and to a understanding of Rawls's normative In of be seen as of the basic structure not within the basic structure by the rules of the basic Cohen the rules of the basic structure as of On this a is for having certain we or in the light of an of and in the light of an understanding of the (Cohen 2008, This of a is not Rawls's is taken from is to Searle's idea of a regulative rules or be in the or Cohen's idea of rules of in the of principles of justice be in the the to justice On the other hand, in an as a of rules and with their and and and the Rawls that is concerned with constitutive rules in Searle's (Rawls [1971, 1999, rules the as or as in opposed to constitutive rules new of social In of Rawls the example of the of In the of the rules of rules as the of a it is not to acting in a way that as a a a and a as a in the of the rules of the the (Rawls 1999, Cohen's the that the of normative to (Cohen Cohen view that it to distributive justice, the normative is on the site of personal behavior and not just on institutional rules the that is a of his In for of the in the (Cohen Cohen the of of the basic not by moral principles that be of social constructivism a basis for this The of constitutive rules to the to on and to an may as of a of social in as and equal citizens. a an or be as having the In Searle's status upon collective that Rawls to a of rules as and and to as as In for that of status as “the that society the with status by collective to this social collective is not to an of In this the of social constructivism overlap with the tradition of political philosophy that and to within the of a conception of the collective is in of that not to an of 2001, In I argue that Rawls's principles of justice as ought to be as constitutive rules for the basic structure of My argument is of about whether there is a between regulative and constitutive rules, or whether in rules regulative and constitutive I not to that constitutive rules the of the basic structure of society. I that a understanding of Rawls's idea of the basic structure involves to the constitutive of principles of justice for the basic and specifically their role in constituting the status of equal in a fair of social and normative to this and the the point of view of social the normative status of equal within a of be seen as by constitutive is in how status within this we from a normative with Rawls, how this ought to be to better the idea of social between and equal citizens. This with the constitutive of rules is of an institutional from it not institutional as it see institutions as for the of it how institutions be in accordance with normative In the I show how Rawls's of an approach both responds to and seeks to an idea of freedom as collective self-government. Rawls's approach to social institutions a tradition in the role of institutions is to relations of equal liberty between This with the by to the role of institutions is to as a to an as (Rawls in The that the by and the is for Rawls of the first in justice as the basic structure is taken as the primary subject of on Rawls's is in political and basic justice” (Rawls 2007, In a the we as citizens the and of basic justice the of the basic structure of society. be seen as the role of institutions in social freedom justice as it the basic structure of society as the first subject of justice” (Rawls On an of and society the other and (Rawls In to this ethical view of social institutions, Cohen's understanding of institutions, and of their for justice, be seen as an or choice This approach in the of and is by taken as of social institutions and to coercive is of in this way is that on a of institutional seen as to with institutional in to better their not see institutional as in and of themselves of Cohen's critique of Rawls a on the concessions the difference principle makes to the of In the for the to their a just society a for justice the of Finally, the of the difference principle is seen as a of the to the in society as as coercive to of their (Cohen 2008, The ethical view of social institutions, on the other hand, is by of of these on this seen as to the to social and political seen as in in is not in seen as to institutional and these seen as in the of these on the basis of moral that the political the ethical conception as the that institutional to social between and equal citizens as a in and of for these On Rawls's there is a of labor between and moral in conceptions of justice” (Rawls [1971, 1999, might be no to the view of institutions a sense of justice (Rawls 1999, theory of society is that taken to a sense of justice, the to an institutional imagination understand their in relation to their as then this the of an institutional imagination on the of political an approach to political philosophy that the idea of the institutional imagination to understand the role of moral conceptions in constituting social institutions that the fair of their conceptions of the by and equal citizens in accordance with their sense of justice. This the and the of imagination with in and the view The social the social understand as the of a within a social as this as opposed to social is a of to light and the constitutive of the an Political philosophy for Rawls involves a division of justificatory labor in a conception of justice in a relationship with a theory of society. Justice as is a conception of justice that both responds to and seeks to an idea of freedom as political conception of justice of the of and equal and this the of a institutional In a political conception of justice a moral conception for social institutions with the of constituting relations of equal liberty between citizens. This the of an institutional imagination on the of collective is for the of a In the I the idea of the institutional imagination from the of first the construction of the rules of the or of social cooperation, and then from the of citizens within the or the players of the I show how a basic structure first be as a structure with the of constituting a of fair social cooperation, and then how justice depends upon in and collective In accordance with the idea of a division of justificatory in the position seen as upon principles for the basic structure of society that justice, this from principles for Rawls of Justice by that is the first of social (Rawls [1971, 1999, Cohen this as an Rawls the of justice to be to the rules for the of society. On this basis, to argue that there of justice that should not or rules of should not be with principles of justice (Cohen 2008, way of Rawls's is as a of and of of how constitutive rules as The that as in is the by that the status the by that a of and the of a the between description and Justice be the first of social institutions we recognize that the basic structure has the of the of of Rawls the basic structure in a way that might that role is On this the basic structure to the in the social institutions and and the division of from social (Rawls [1971, 1999, this to an of the idea of the basic structure that is from other that Rawls in of Rawls upon this how primary subject of the principles of social justice is the basic structure of the of social institutions of 1999, In Political Rawls the basic structure I a and institutions, and how of social from to the (Rawls see also Rawls 2001, the way in the basic structure not of social and institutions taken as given of the way or of (Rawls Rawls 2001, is to the idea of the basic is that it enables to think about society as a On Rawls's social is by basic or the political and of and the of and the and the family in of social cooperation, and the and that within or within the institutions of the basic The role of the position is to the idea of to this (Rawls is that point to any of as a of social institutions a of social The that institutions of the basic structure is a social upon collective of institutions to the of the social as a of the idea or moral conception that we of the of these The position provides a from to conception of justice is to institutions a of social in accordance with the idea that the of the basic structure is to a of institutions that enables a fair of social between and equal citizens. it is of the of of the principles of justice that it not principles to an institutional taken as of justice as the provides a of thought for understanding how principles of justice be in institutions (Rawls The principles of justice as be seen as constitutive rules of the as in as and equal with the this in the of a structure that the principle of equal basic as in the of an and social structure that the principle of fair of Finally, as I in the labor as of in the of collective on the difference principle. of a conception of the difference principle is not a principle of distributive is it to Rawls the principles of justice as to the that to the first to the idea of in the first principle with of fair and to the difference (Rawls [1971, 1999, the role of the difference principle within the of a social and structure that the principles of justice is to understanding Rawls's of and for (Rawls [1971, 1999, Rawls 2001, on the of and within a of institutions taken as In democracy, by “the is to in the basic institutions the idea of society as a fair of between citizens as and (Rawls 2001, Rawls's idea of a division of justificatory labor between a moral conception and a theory of society is no in the of the of justice in political (Rawls [1971, 1999, the of an to the basic of the not a distributive (Rawls Rawls 2001, as as and and that is not an institutional for and a way of and in the (Rawls [1971, 1999, see also Rawls Rawls institutions to be on Rawls's a idea of as and equal citizens be in the first principles in accordance with the basic structure the way the social and a certain of by with certain conceptions of their (Rawls In this Rawls that justice as has with the understanding of Rawls's idea of the basic structure might be Cohen's interpretation to of this the basic structure as “the of social and is to the basic (Rawls [1971, 1999, In the way that players the to a and fair of the game, the members of a society the of to their and in by the principles of justice. This collective is the of having an sense of justice. to from principles to in an of (Rawls [1971, 1999, In Political Rawls the view that the of a society may be by with a game, that as a political conception of justice, justice as a political conception of the (Rawls If we understand the basic structure in this it to see in sense the family and of of a just basic there is about within the basic structure of society as Rawls that not a or from we social or to (Rawls 2001, see also Rawls [1971, 1999, the idea of to understand how institutions in accordance with an idea of fair social between and equal citizens helps to both the of the basic structure is and how it is to be The family be seen as of the basic structure as role is the and of not need to any to this it is by principles of justice the freedom and of and the of as citizens by political principles (Rawls 1999, Cohen the as a between of the basic structure as legally coercive and the family as as it is to between coercive and may be of the and family for coercive structure within the of the it is not to understand as for the of an in the basic it be This is Rawls with an understanding of On his citizens political and coercive as a to and their In coercive citizens ought to their in accordance with (Rawls of social institutions of the basic structure whether and in way an is and be by principles of justice, that that be within the of in a position to see in sense of of a just basic rules to on that of their In this Rawls between to principles and that an conception of as and equal citizens (Rawls recognize them as In this Rawls's may be to idea of or specifically the idea of see Justice as society as an of in their relations to recognize certain rules of as (Rawls [1971, 1999, to for a social of just basic as and with on (Rawls see also is it be by of is in that the a of just of justice and social in citizens recognize themselves and other as by principles that them to their equal status and their in on conception of justice not not of their conceptions of the enables by constituting them as with the status of and equal to the of fair social that a society. The of of a just basic not of collective social in accordance with the of a political conception of justice for the basic structure of society. Rawls the difference principle as an interpretation of the principle of of to this is to the of This to the political relationship of a that to be in the family (Rawls [1971, 1999, Cohen by that an to the difference principle in their labor (Cohen 2008, this argument is the constitutive and not regulative role of Rawls's principles of justice. people to from a social point of to the of and to them to the of and to this in a way with choice of and fair of (Rawls 2001, the difference principle as a constitutive not attention to the role of incentives in the of in the of the also a way of understanding how of their conceptions of the be with the Cohen's is that the basic of Rawls's argument is to the of the of of the (Cohen On the of there for Rawls's theory with theory of the the idea that of by their should be as as to not or by them the from the of social justice” (Rawls [1971, 1999, see also we other from the that Cohen that a of in of to be (Cohen is a difference between their as and the collective that is and themselves to, rules of social of political in an to show in the and of and the of a the of the of In a social in there is a to the of their conceptions of the as a to the The is and the Rawls be seen as this In themselves to principles to their in the of and in that in the in accordance with a that their sense of justice. by an it is an of in their political status as a to principles of justice that and a fair of social this way of understanding the basic structure a to Cohen's of Rawls's of that Cohen to the in the of the in for labor incentives that them the the of the of the least just society an personal behavior that Rawls's principles of justice as constitutive rules for the basic it that Cohen's argument to of how the that the basic structure is the primary subject of justice is and of on political in the first In with of Rawls's Cohen Rawls's of incentives in from the role of the seeks to a argument for the difference principle from Rawls's the position the position to be a choice argument I the role of the position is to the role of principles of justice in the basic structure of society. the for incentives that I in the Rawls that of this be for to the difference principle (Rawls [1971, 1999, considerations not by themselves to an argument in justice as be in of the position (Rawls [1971, 1999, political as their the of fair of the of social cooperation, for it is the of the basic structure that we we as and equal citizens. The of the of in the position this of principles of justice. principles for the basic structure constitutive regulative rules, Rawls's principles of justice involves the of coercive structure by and the of to a be in social institutions, and of a of social Moreover, Rawls on to the position to the of to to political to to as opposed to of social we in about the relationship between and social institutions, and about of In that political fair rules of the of social between and equal justice as is not to the of the for incentives by acquisitive that Cohen I in the that Cohen's critique of Rawls be for a of with to Rawls's description of the difference principle as an interpretation of the principle of might be that has been to the role of an of in Cohen's critique of the point of Cohen's critique might be seen as to the of the that the difference principle and relations of justificatory I argue that Rawls's with the we his position from this is not that the of is not we should we should to the idea that Rawls is concerned with the Cohen is concerned with the it has been on the the difference between Rawls and Cohen it is not that Cohen is not concerned about we should to Cohen understand justice first and as a of we should about in a way that I Rawls On a for Cohen, justice is a of and specifically is a of is a to the of just a with how we should to is in the that Cohen to the for incentives by the The whether an argument for a as as a of a by any of society to any other (Cohen 2008, The of an argument to the is of the that to in relations of justificatory (Cohen 2008, Cohen is concerned with how we should to the be seen as to an or has the The though, is that Cohen is concerned with how we should to individuals, Rawls is concerned with how we should to members of a moral citizens. In both Cohen and Rawls concerned with of it is whether both concerned with the of Cohen's as a that for to the of distributive justice. the argue for the of incentives themselves in in from their (Cohen 2008, for incentives by the and be seen to the in the first that the that it is themselves not Rawls, on the other hand, provides a of in of the way in to we in of to to as and equal citizens a for upon the we as citizens the of the basic structure of the position the of a political justificatory is an of argument that in the just by Rawls and Cohen be be be in the The that be to in normative a of in Rawls's principles of justice not principles for principles for a I the of the difference as an interpretation of the principle of be from the point of view of a society that the of the principles of justice as Moreover, Rawls not any argument for the of considerations that need to be from the of the position to be with the difference principle. Rawls's conception of justice of as and as might with (Rawls 1999, as not of their conceptions of the also to to to social to from the in accordance with their sense of justice. Justice as to sense of justice in constitutive rules for a of that in and of conceptions of the The for from the of is not to to an of justice in personal to that and be in of the or that as and the of In the debate between Cohen and Rawls normative about whether the site of justice should be to the basic If we to understand the this debate be within the of of the relationship between structure and The institutional imagination is a to of that of understanding the relationship between and society The from Rawls that I in the as the idea of the institutional imagination by to how the status of equal might social world. Rawls, political role of is with role in to social (Rawls 2001, 2007, see also Rawls 1999, The of the difference principle the for social as in the of and the principles of and their the distribution of and the of social be to upon that the to to be by how better we might been we an equal with the social been (Rawls [1971, 1999, The idea of to social should not be as in an status it the basic structure of social in a way that to status as and equal that social is of may be in the this ethical view of institutions is the institutional imagination it is and of Cohen adopts the that “the personal is The idea of the institutional imagination to the of this might be to that on Cohen's view the political is is to a domain of the of and equal citizens. is for Cohen a in we may to an idea of justice that the that social both necessary and should that the is the of the should and that the is the of the then it is not any of with we should be concerned Then we might return to the collective of to the we see with of we might to