This chapter identifies two different categories of judicial response to increasingly common religious-based claims for recognition, accommodation, and exemption in constitutional democracies: (i) “diversity as inclusion”; and (ii) “non-state law as competition.” The chapter argues that as long as legal claims for accommodation are not seen as challenging the lexical superiority of the constitutional order itself (“diversity as inclusion”), they stand a fair chance of success. By contrast, constitutional courts exhibit unyielding reluctance to accept as binding or even cognizable any potentially competing legal order that originates in sacred or customary sources of identity and authority, where the legal challenge at issue is interpreted as raising doubts regarding which set of norms and institutions, or what set of high priests, should have the final word in authoritatively resolving legal disputes within a given society (“non-state law as competition”). Drawing upon recent constitutional jurisprudence from Canada and South Africa, the chapter shows that even the most accommodating polities, those that are constitutionally committed to a version of multicultural or “differentiated” citizenship, are not keen on autonomous, rival adjudicative systems that derive their authority and morality from sources external to, and in some cases insulated from, the constitutional order.