Associative Solidarity, Relational Goods, and Autonomy for Refugees: What Does it Mean to Stand in Solidarity with Refugees?

Solidarity is a concept that has been applied only sparsely in the discussion of cosmopolitan justice so far.1 If it is applied to the cosmopolitan sphere, then it has been mostly understood as “as a relationship among individuals or among groups or associations. In this use, people are understood as potentially feeling solidarity with the suffering of others or as standing with them in their struggles.”2 The concept of solidarity has also not seen much attention in the discussion of migration justice, both immigration and emigration. Yet thinking about refugees and thinking about solidarity allows to link the international and the domestic debates since asylum-seekers who ask for refuge transcend the international—national divide. Refugees, in other words, are an excellent test case to evaluate different conceptions of solidarity in political philosophy. In this paper, I want to do two things: first, I want to investigate what account of solidarity can plausibly explain any obligations toward refugees. In liberal-egalitarian writing, solidarity has often been motivated to support the social welfare state—it becomes then one of the necessities of that state.3 I will juxtapose the definition of solidarity as social solidarity supported by David Miller, for instance, to that of political solidarity. This conceptualization has recently been proposed by Avery Kolers.4 In Miller's view, the notion of a “duty of solidarity” refers to the particularistic duties that flow from what is shared, namely a national identity and common belonging to a group. Kolers, starts from the premise that linguistically, a duty of solidarity could also refer to the duty to engage in practices that create what is shared, that create the community among which solidarity can be demanded. To “stand in solidarity” is then the willingness to engage in certain practices of sharing or defining a solidaristic community. I argue that neither of these accounts of social and political solidarity quite captures the concept of solidarity. One of the important dimensions of the promise of asylum is the idea of providing for conditions of agency and autonomy among refugees. Thus, my starting point is the premise that all human beings have a basic need to stand in particularistic relationships with others, for their autonomy-based needs to be met. I then apply this understanding of solidarity to the case of refugees. The promise of refuge and asylum is not simply to provide shelter and protection against human rights violations, but also to provide those who ask for refuge with a new home and the basis of social membership. Agency and autonomy in the forms I construe them here demand that social needs are met. If these needs go unmet, I argue that the promise of asylum remains unfulfilled. I explain that social needs can be met in two different ways: first, through the (much discussed) aspect of social recognition within society; and second, through providing for the sources of self-respect within society. Assessing political solidarity from this perspective, I show that it provides a picture in which the particular is largely absent. Political solidarity in Kolers' account defines a general duty to provide people with what is needed for autonomy. Yet, what people need is a space of particular relationships in which the autonomous life can be built. I explain that political solidarity neglects the need for social relationships. In this respect, conceptualizing solidarity as a duty neglects the constructivist principle that we need to think about the particular person and their need when analyzing what moral equality requires. Put differently, political solidarity seemingly neglects the social context in which individuals are treated as equals. One way of treating individuals with equal respect is to assure that all have access to the means of self-respect. In contrast, when Miller speaks of a duty of solidarity, he provides a picture in which the particular forms the limit of the realm of our duties of solidarity. The people with whom we stand in solidarity are the only people to whom we have normative duties—apart from very thin humanitarian duties toward outsiders, as I will explain. Instead, I argue that we need an account of solidarity that neither ignores the need for particular relational spaces; nor makes the presence of those relationships the limit of our obligation. I call this associative solidarity.5 In part two of the paper, I examine what specifically the account of associative solidarity would demand. Many calls for solidarity with refugees seem to lack a prescription of what solidarity with refugees would provide for individual persons. My proposal of associative solidarity aims to address this lack. I suggest that refuge is the most appropriate site for a duty of solidarity, since refugees are by definition the most vulnerable to the annihilation of the social—they are persecuted by their states of origin, stripped of their social, political and civic rights and lack the protection of a state. We, therefore, have an obligation to stand in solidarity with individuals having suffered this loss, by creating particularistic bonds with them to meet their social needs. I argue that solidarity with refugees is a universal obligation of justice, namely to build what is particular. I end with an example to illustrate the content of a duty of solidarity toward refugees. The Canadian Refugee sponsorship regime implies that each refugee has a group of individuals or a family involved and preoccupied with their successful integration into the social fabric. Sponsors “provide financial support and settlement assistance for the refugees they sponsor, usually for one year after arrival.”6 The most immediate advantage of the system is that refugees have a social network upon arrival in the host society. They have a group of people who feel responsible for them, who share the task of finding housing, entertaining and introducing them to the ways of their new society, finding clothing and employment. As I will explain, the program illustrates what may constitute solidarity with refugees in light of the need to distribute access to relational goods fairly, and in light of the promise of asylum that includes providing access to the means of individual autonomy and agency. The relationship between refugees and members of the needs to be social or political accounts of solidarity can or so I account of the basis and of social solidarity or solidarity within has been proposed by David Miller who it in about national identity and of Miller's account of social solidarity is motivated by the that states need to have the social conditions in to support within the context of the welfare state. this the social solidarity solidarity is to the that individuals with their a feeling only within the context of a national Miller that we be of immigration that may the of our community for of what to of social In Miller about a to of he and that of only a common can provide the of solidarity that and social the of which be the of this to be successful the the and they one to with what the of to the the will usually have each person be that the others will this the of the host society, integration it allows to with that and to national identity as their that identity to their a national identity is a that can a to of social justice, and as a To be Miller that the and a national identity is This is to that national identity is civic that can and and to them that they are part of those who and the The community Miller has in in other words, is not my remains is to that Miller's of solidarity that the community has to be first, we can of solidarity. This is to that we do not a community through of solidarity but we share solidarity of our community. this solidarity within is a of a of of a or of integration into a solidarity from as a and In Miller's discussion of what we to he for that our for and which with obligations toward duties of we for our Miller's of the social solidarity makes two different that are in the context of my The is that of community are the basis for solidaristic The is that social solidarity is for social two are different in and in are not as as Miller I will the of which I to be a about the of solidarity. one could that is simply a between Miller's and my Miller could that we duties of solidarity to outsiders, that we have a of duties toward I have and Miller's this is important for my here is that Miller not of solidaristic obligations toward as Instead, our duties toward are their but they are not duties of solidarity. To this differently, we may linguistically, that we feel solidarity with of and the to are not to solidarity within a which is and In to Miller's account of solidarity as from a Avery that solidarity defines the community to which we have This is important since it allows for of the solidaristic group. defines account of solidarity as Thus, obligations are individual obligations to constitute the in of Solidarity is the for a not a group. of Kolers' account is the of that those who in solidarity have to in solidarity is to about what is to be and to those with whom in solidarity. To stand in solidarity then not that we need to with the of and by In to Miller's of social solidarity, to which solidarity of a political of solidarity not that we to social Instead, the political concept of solidarity that those we to what of we to To the example of who to the for a If a to be in solidarity with but into or the to to to This is we to solidarity as political One that a of be it is not to This is to that I to with a of it is not what my solidarity can I do not that is we have a particular idea what solidaristic I can to a to in my I do not with the of to Put differently, not of the and different can as of concept of solidarity is to in that solidarity a standing with others and a to with them, a certain understanding of the social of these others and a with Kolers, to argue for a concept of solidarity. In this duties of solidarity are in to others from to not individuals are in the of others or a group of others To this the duty of solidarity that defines with whom we stand in example may illustrate what has in that our to be in solidarity is that we want to the of those who lack equal access to to Kolers' the group with whom we stand in solidarity may who we to lack access to equal and or not these are or for we could that we are in solidarity with in our community we that they lack access to equal in an that and and that so as Yet when with of lack of access to equality of we may to our political the as the of and with This is we that standing in solidarity, a duty in Kolers' not the of the but only the content of the The content of the duty from the for with those who of in the instance, we could think that Miller and Kolers' accounts build upon each Miller the community from which of solidarity the content of the obligations of solidarity, a of Kolers' of solidarity as is a of the account of Miller's concept of solidarity. Yet could argue that is a of of duties of Miller's duties of social solidarity are then they do not with the of duties of solidarity that As I duties of social solidarity often with duties toward Miller not the of duties toward as duties of solidarity duties Kolers' account for the case of refugees. the link between solidarity and a idea of and moral respect the we would need the concept of solidarity in the we solidarity simply as the through which we our respect and moral for the welfare of it is not solidarity with refugees is Put differently, the account here the what moral the concept of solidarity as political solidarity can plausibly upon to stand in solidarity, could we not that we are upon to respect the equal moral of all human and that we to in with the duty that from this Put what solidarity to the I have Miller's account of social solidarity with account of political solidarity. I have Miller for feeling or social as of solidarity, and have with who for an account of solidarity and as I the political of solidarity to the what solidarity is I suggest is the aspect of Kolers' with political solidarity is that it neglects an important aspect of what it means to show equal moral respect to all in a I want to argue that the social aspect of solidarity needs to be in to individuals their moral the case of solidarity with refugees then means to and address social and of community that refugees To this the social conditions of individual autonomy and agency as important of an individual life the migration and refuge that individual agency and autonomy among but refugees in to be an important of and an important of asylum In the instance, this discussion is part of the definition of what the promise of asylum I that the promise of asylum includes the of a new the protection of human rights and access to social membership. of human rights are for to or the duty to their human rights to provide them with access to the of social, civic and political is as an it the to access the conditions of autonomy within the of Yet this promise to in the This needs of refugees have been to two and it has that the most way to provide rights is through not to be this to access to with particular the to and of regime which is in to the of autonomy of refugees has been to finding for regime which to refugees in and the of their is or the refugee or to to their has a regime which to and which the refugee refugee protection is not about for Refugee protection is to creating conditions of and which refugees to they to with is about not about the of and and point to the refugee namely to provide for the conditions of autonomy for those who have been persecuted in their home who have their human rights and who are a new In this view, the of protection to conditions of to as much as the conditions to individuals to the of they to One way of the of moral respect that is to that we need to provide with a new home and access to in their new that I do not to that refugees may not to to their of the to may be important way to individual autonomy as I have I simply to suggest that social in the of asylum in the of in the of is or not is an important of individual autonomy. may to this one I want to here is that the conditions of autonomy and agency that and argue for social membership. in need their social needs met in to be to have access to the means of autonomy and agency that the of asylum and The not refer to and social but to social of is a lack of for or human associative and can different The one is of that is and that refugees are from their can have their for autonomous of social may from the that those persecuted by their states of in an as Put differently, in the instance, asylum-seekers do not have the of nor that of members to the their asylum they are in ways from the of society. do not have the to their are as are their This is not to that asylum-seekers are and to by members of the host groups and it their to those to their are of and members of in have to of their asylum-seekers are not in the way that asylum-seekers that their asylum is and they are the way to within the society, may they access to the social that would their social, civic and political needs as Yet we can that a to their way into the of asylum that them from the of people and their new As refugees a particular of social namely social in the of of or or of community social to an often aspect of our in about solidarity, namely relational needs. needs are basic human needs in relationships are an important basic social need since they provide access to the basis of individual self-respect as I have the basis of self-respect as a that all to distribute through the of the states do not the promise of the equal moral of their to has two includes a of that of of is implies a in so as it is within to The of our in having a of life and finding our person and and by others who are and their To this differently, individuals will have access to the basis of self-respect they can engage in and and a life that they or as the conditions for autonomy and the for self-respect since it individual members the recognition by others as equal members of when social members of are not only recognition of their also individual members the to ask for since only members can demand One needs to be as a moral equal one can a for equal social relationships are important for the of individual autonomy. refers here to account of autonomy. to it is to into the means of autonomy as in the to community is then important it allows to as the person we would to as who we want to be and we to be by could that Kolers' political account of solidarity captures this social that that we a of to others, others as the they associative solidarity these of My account of associative solidarity that relational goods are part of what we to individuals as moral not only of the relationships but relational needs are part of the basic needs all individuals to have met. The point I to therefore, is that social is an important of individuals their moral the of having of needs met. Yet social is by the that from states as an as who is often as a of or as a to the host society, as who is as a or of are may refugees of a of belonging to the social fabric. The social to their to their new may have to the to be This may be the case as they are in the and be the way to equal through and we the link between the relational aspect of our and the basis for individual autonomy and for self-respect both and then the of social refugees is the lack of recognition and the of individual is then also when and of the of social relationships we can individual refugees do not have access to the basis of individual autonomy and agency. Yet this is what be the of refugee as I that we that social relationships most the of social context that is the basis of self-respect and provides the conditions for individual autonomy. I want to argue that the of social for refugees is One of the social are important in our of access to the goods of is the that social can goods that individuals their or and social are not only for individual autonomy and the basis of but relational also a of of that be in an relational is their the relationship for their and As defines them, are goods that are through and within relationships or are of certain and most for the proposed relational in the relationships and that and The of social and social that refugees are from this of They are from in the of relational and from my the relational as community can be through we need to of the social that the and of relational between the to access relational and the social and that provide those the can be a the are To we social groups to members of society, or them as members in we can that all members of have equal access to the that the and for relational society. we much self-respect a person we can has access to the social of and it is these social that to as and social that the to into with others, they have to meet other people in a way that the of or and relational and much autonomy people have to their of would be of of and those of and and those of the we think about relational from the of associative In a instance, we could argue that providing for equal access to the of that social may be part of a political account of solidarity. that I Kolers' account as a account of solidarity, which we have duties of solidarity could that of social is a to stand in solidarity with refugees. what is about Kolers' account is that he it to be the members of the solidaristic group are by standing could we support the of social in a that is not in for or and which the social group through I that Kolers' account of political solidarity not the of social that is the moral for refugees. As I Kolers' account of the duty to solidarity with whom we stand in solidarity but it not to the content of the In other words, it social as part of what we to refugees. Miller's account of social solidarity as the to social justice goods may be in this Miller the idea of community as the of solidaristic and as a in individual The here since social solidarity from a community. This is for all those who want to the community as refugees. to my point of I want to the what it would to stand in solidarity with refugees we that access to the basis of self-respect is an important that states I have access to this as social This is to that states assure that conditions are in to access relational goods for all those in their is important to the between providing relational and providing the conditions to access relational As I in my discussion of states can not provide for relational goods they can into that distribute them, and assure that access to these is equal to I motivated this with the that social a social that be among all members of society, among new as refugees. social provide for the of social recognition that individuals need to be to and their idea and of the This is the basis of individual self-respect as a of is also the that need to Thus, states need to a way to provide individual refugees with access to the and social This is the of associative solidarity. I it to that from the of associative solidarity, of are not The aspect is the lack of for Many asylum-seekers in for not for the of their very in the host society, often in from the of and often to The as a to meet social needs is This is not to that in the provides relational goods since who are may lack them the of the the to access relational access that is one is from it of the of their that a asylum-seekers in the social relationships that would be important in and a new home for of having their for asylum and having to that refugees have social relationships and to this may simply be what would solidarity with refugees asylum be so that individuals and in to access to the of the those who to be from of that asylum-seekers have access to are and associative To be could argue that asylum-seekers very often have associative with other asylum-seekers and relational needs could be met through these could that of the relational needs that I to be basic needs. Yet this the of social who social are not simply or but they are to with other members of society. To with other individuals who access to the in not provide for the of community that recognition and the of self-respect. my of the that asylum-seekers have to that to be only as of or to be in their for to be as and so Thus, is an important part of social it not be the only and associative for asylum-seekers since it often them with others who to with those whom they to and refugees also of within the state. Many states for asylum-seekers and as settlement or to to their having to to or in asylum may seem for or a of among different of Yet limit the of social relationships that individuals may to In the I to the example of the Canadian Refugee sponsorship system to illustrate the of a solidaristic of asylum may demand. The Canadian Refugee sponsorship regime can as an example to think about what as solidarity with refugees in light of the need to distribute access to relational goods fairly, and in light of the promise of asylum that includes providing access to the means of individual autonomy and agency. As I the program implies that each refugee has a group of individuals or a family involved and preoccupied with their successful integration into the social fabric. the provide access to the of the and to those of society. provide access to social that may provide for of the individual of social it not seem to that are motivated to by an idea of social solidarity in Miller's Instead, may be motivated by of political solidarity as Sponsors to show moral respect to they to others their moral and to the of a new and their their to may constitute a new solidaristic community. Yet to provide refugees with a new the particular relationships that autonomy and agency have to be into a account of solidarity. In other words, refugees need associative solidarity. I to what it would to stand in solidarity with refugees. I what I call a of associative solidarity that to the cosmopolitan refugees. This in to the social solidarity that a national and community and the political account of solidarity proposed by Avery Kolers, which a duty to stand in solidarity with those who I both in important social solidarity not explain the of cosmopolitan as who want to a community can from solidaristic the political account of solidarity to of the relational of a In to my I show that we it to refugees to social and to social needs. To this I what is to refugees in the context of individual autonomy and agency. One of the important dimensions of the promise of asylum is the idea of providing for conditions of agency and autonomy among refugees. Agency and autonomy in the forms I construe them here demand that the social needs of individual refugees can be met. The promise of refuge and asylum is not simply to provide shelter and protection against human rights violations, but also to provide those who ask for refuge with a new home and the basis of social membership. Thus, I have that need to conditions which individuals can have access to relational I have that relational goods provide access to social access to social is then is In this is one of the we can from the political account of having equal access to social goods is one of the duty of of this have been the in the the the of the of the of and the and the Many are to all in these in particular to and who have access and by is a for for